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The 2001 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy in Light of Recent 
Developments in the Sub-Region of Africa 
 
 The democracy-peace building nexus, beyond its traditional foothold in the liberal theory 
of International Relations, is a two-sided theoretical equation, resting on two plausible 
arguments.1 Developed by Immanuel Kant in the nineteenth century and subsequently 
popularized in the twentieth century by Woodrow Wilson and his heir, Michael Doyle, on one 
side of the equation is the traditional Kantian thesis that democracies do not go to war with one 
another, suggesting that, the wider the democratic space within a subordinate state system, the 
greater the prospect for peace.2  On the other side is a contemporary variant, which gained 
ascendancy and popularity immediately after the Cold War and conceptualized by the former 
United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali,3 which contends not only that 
democracies do not go to war but democracies, because of inbuilt institutional mechanisms4 
embedded in them, do equally widen the zones of peace within states.5  
 Either way, in our contemporary global system, the issue is no longer whether democracy 
and its institutional appurtenances have the capacity to incubate and nurture peaceful co-
existence within and among nations but what would become of them should democracy go on 
retreat.6 In the words of Sisk, “of the range of tools available to conflict resolution practitioners 
to manage intractable conflicts, none of them is arguably more durable over the long term…than 
the creation and nurturing of democracy.”7 Retrospectively, this seemingly immutable ethos may 
have driven Western European statesmen and diplomats to weave their continent’s security and 
peace-building architectures not only around supra-nationality but also on building democracies 
within and between countries after the Second World War.8 
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 By the late 1970s—courtesy of democratic third waves—the Western European initiative 
began to spread into other regions of the world. In sub-Sahara Africa, civil organizations began 
to frame the continent’s development, peace, and security agendas around nurturing democratic 
governance in member-states. For instance, the Kampala Document (a proceeding from the 1991 
conference in Kampala, Uganda, organized by the African Leadership Forum (ALF) with support 
from UNECA) anchors peace and security within African nations on the security of individual citizen 
to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs while being able to participate fully in societal affairs and 
enjoying freedoms and fundamental human rights.’9  
 African leaders soon began to pontificate about democratic governance, albeit, caring less 
about institutional development or the quality of elections.10 In West Africa, the crises in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone gave impetus to quest for the institutionalization of democratic norms and 
values among countries of the sub-region. These two crises pulled into the spotlight the security 
dilemma often associated with undemocratic tyrannical regimes and the threats posed by such 
regimes, not only to their countries but the sub-region as a whole. Between 1991 and 2001, 
statesmen, diplomats, and technocrats in the sub-region, under the auspices of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), developed and adopted three major democracy 
cum governance frameworks—the 1991 Declaration on Political Objectives, the 1999 
Mechanisms for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, and the 2001 
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance—as grand strategies for dealing 
with governance and security issues.  
 Against this background and in the light of contemporary happenings in the sub-region, it 
is imperative to examine West Africa’s post-Cold War attempts at institutionalizing democracy 
cum governance frameworks at the level of member states. This article, sourcing data from 
documentary sources and adopting descriptive, historical, and analytical methods of data 
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analysis, outlines the major provisions of the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance11 and assesses member states’ performance with regard to the outlined 
provisions, in the light contemporary realities.  
 In term of organization, this article is structured into five broad parts, starting with an 
introduction pointing to the article’s background, purpose, and organization. The second part 
conceptualizes and contextualizes the key concepts that are germane to our discourse. This is 
followed by the discussion of theoretical framework that informed the study. Part four 
undertakes two tasks. First, it highlights and examines the governance cum democracy 
provisions in the 2001 Supplementary Protocol. Second, it assesses the performances of state 
parties with regard to its key provisions. The fifth part concludes the paper. 
Defining Democracy and Peace    
 In a study of this nature, it is apposite to conceptualize and contextualize the concepts of 
democracy and peace. This is especially true with social inquiry, in which concepts often assume 
different meanings and interpretations. In the words of Rubin and Babbie “we specify what we 
mean when we use particular terms for the purpose of facilitating their contextual 
operationalization and comprehension.”12 With regard to the concept of democracy, aside from 
being nebulously contested, it is also ideologically loaded and as such not amenable to universal 
definition.13 What have therefore resulted are divergent perspectives and variants to the 
definition of the concept. According to Przeworski et al, “Almost all normatively desirable 
aspects of political life, and sometime even of social and economic life, are credited as definition 
features of democracy: representation, accountability, equality participation, dignity, rationality, 
security, freedom-the list goes on—indeed, according to many definitions, the set of true 
democracy is an empty set.”14 
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 It is not within the purview of the paper to resolve the controversies over the meaning of 
democracy, but it is essential to conceptualize and operationalize democracy in a broader 
context. According to Weale, “Looking at literature on democracy, we read of pluralist 
democracy, radical democracy, liberal democracy, socialist democracy, one-party democracy, 
deliberative democracy, polyarchy, elitist democracy, equilibrium democracy and so on.”15   
Notwithstanding all these, broadly speaking, there are three schools of thought to the definition 
of what democracy means. The first, drawing from the Athenian model,16 views democracy in a 
deliberative form. It argues that ordinary citizens are the objects of political participation and that 
no attempt should be made to limit their participation in the political process. Rousseau, the 
French philosopher remarked in 1762, “Citizens are rational and politically conscious entities 
that are inclined to participation.”17 Central to his conception is the idea that citizens’ direct 
participation gave meaning to democracy. In fact he expressed his anti-representation bias thus: 
“Citizens assemble together and decided on the content of law and public policy without the 
mediation of political representatives. In their decision, each seeks the common good or the 
general will.”18  
 Re-echoing Rousseau, contemporary proponents of this school insist that instead of 
rationalizing citizens’ inactiveness, emphasis should be placed on transforming the apathetic 
citizens into democratic citizens. For example, Habermas suggests that democracy should be 
viewed as a method of communication in which rational citizens deliberate in a context of 
openness and equality.19 Joining issues with Habermas, Cohen posits that “policy outcome are 
democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the direct object of a free and reason 
argument among equals.”20 Budge21 notes that it is possible to imagine a form of direct 
democracy that took to their limits participatory devices like referendum or citizens’ initiatives 
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that currently exist only in restricted form in representative democracies. Indeed, he proposes a 
conception of democracy where information and communication technologies could make 
possible, extensive citizen involvement in the making of public policies. In their contribution to 
the school, Guttmann and Thompson see it as, “a form of government in which free and equal 
citizens (and their representative), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another 
reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching 
conclusions that are binding in the present all citizens but open challenge in the future.”22  
 Counterpoised to the citizen conception of democracy is the elite variant which conceives 
democracy in elitist terms. Whether in its representational or pluralist variant, it equates the 
demos with the elites in the society. Specifically, this perspective asserts that democracy is a 
method of making decisions which ensures efficiency in administration and policy making and 
yet requires some measures of responsiveness to popular opinion on the part of the ruling elites.23 
The central contention of this perspective is that since it is impossible for the average citizen to 
know enough to participate intelligently in decision-making, democracy should be about the few 
intelligent and rational ones taking decisions on behalf of others. In this view, the only role 
expected of the generality of the citizen is to check on the political elites.   
 Lending credence to this view, Schumpeter24 contends that mass participation must be 
limited to voting and should exclude such issues as letter writing or the petitioning of 
representatives. These political activities, according to him, amounted to mounting pressure on 
the representatives before the expiration of their tenure. As he puts it: “Democracy does not 
mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any real sense of the term, ‘people’ and 
‘rule.’ Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the 
men who are to rule over them.”25  
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 Schumpeter’s point is that the only right the people have is throwing out the “rascals” 
periodically. Arguing within the Schumpeterian orbit, Dahl,26 O’Gorman,27 and Wolfe28 equally 
posit that democracy entails citizens casting their votes for competing elites in elections. Still 
further, Schmiltter and Karl consider democracy as a system of government in which the rulers 
are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through 
competition.29 
 The third perspective—the most popular since the end of the Cold War—the liberal 
variant seeks to integrate the authority of governments with simultaneous limits on their scope. 
In the words of Hague and Harrop, “liberal democracy is limited government. The goal is to 
secure individual liberty, including freedom from unwarranted demands by government.”30 
Liberal democracy (this perspective further contends) balances the demands of individual rights 
and collective politics. As Weale describes liberal democracy,   
On the one hand, it provides the means by which the people govern, or at least 
elect their representatives who govern. On the other hand, it contains 
constitutional device, like separation of power or a system of checks and balances 
that limit the scope and application of the principle of majority rule31 
 In clear terms, what this conception of democracy implies is that without liberties as 
 guaranteed by the constitution, there can be no democracy.32  
 
In other words, democracy only has meaning if defined in the context of freedoms—free 
elections, free speech, free movement, free press, etc.—as enshrined in the constitution as 
fundamental human rights.33 Danjibo34 itemizes these rights as: i) the right to life; ii) the right to 
human dignity; iii) the right to participate in decision making; iv) respect for the rule of law; v) 
security of life and property; vi) the right to vote and be voted for; vii) freedom of speech; viii) 
freedom of association; ix) freedom of the press; and x) freedom to live freely everywhere. 
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 Given the divergent perspectives about the meaning of democracy as discussed above, 
how is it conceptualized for the purpose of this article? It is conceptualized as a political order 
that ideally purport to give power to the majority but in reality empowers the minority to run the 
society based on its definition of the common good.  
On Peace  
 Like democracy, justice, freedom, happiness, and other human value related concepts, 
peace is difficult to define. What have thus emerged in literature are different approaches for 
conceptualizing peace.35 It has to be stressed that, traditionally, peace has always been denoted 
as the converse of war.36 Writing in this tradition, Wright37 remarks that war is not sharply 
distinguished from peace.” Aron38 sees peace as a condition of more or less lasting suspension of 
rivalry between political units. However, in recent times, this orthodox view has been called into 
question by perspective that insists that peace does not suggests only the absence of war but also 
the establishment of positive, life-enhancing values. For example, Ibeanu39 contends that 
conceiving peace as the converse of conflict—though attractive—is inadequate for understanding 
the ontology of peace.  
 It was in view of this reality that Galtung,40—a pioneer peace researcher—broadened the 
definition of peace and proposed a distinction between “positive” and “negative” peace. The 
former, according to him, denotes the simultaneous presence of many desirable states of mind 
and society, such as harmony, justice, equity, and so on. The latter denotes the “absence of war” 
and other forms of large-scale violent human conflict. With regard to the former, he adds, “it 
refers to a social condition in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated and in which there is 
neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural violence.”41 The 
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concept of peace has divergent interpretations but for the purpose of this study it is 
operationalized as the absence of condition that could threaten society’s orderly existence.   
Democracy and Peace: A Theoretical Exploration  
 Emanating from an attempt to construct zones of “stable peace,”42 the democratic peace 
paradigm is based on the assumption that democratic states do not wage war on each other.43 
However, that does not mean that democracies do not wage wars at all or that they are less 
warlike in their relations with non-democracies, only that democracies tend not to fight each 
other.44 Here, it has to be emphasized that proponents of this theory often present two viewpoints 
to justify this theoretical contention: the structural and normative perspectives.45 The first 
explains the theory by pointing to the institutional constraints place on decision makers in 
democracies. Put differently, legislatures, rule of law, the electorates, as well as international 
liberal norms that states subscribe to tend to mitigate against rash decisions to go to war.46 This 
paper’s second focus is on the ideas and norms underlying liberal democracy. As Owen puts it, 
“democrac[ies] practise compromise in their internal politics, believe that it is imprudent to fight 
each other and confer legitimacy upon other states believed to be democratic, making it unjust to 
wage wars upon those states.”47 Either way, both views mirror the conception of global politics 
in the post-Cold War World. They could also have influenced the drafters of most international 
conventions on democracy, human rights, and good governance, especially in the post-
Westphalia era, in which states internal political organization take precedence over sovereignty. 
In this wise, the drafters of the 2001 Supplementary Protocol could equally have been attracted 
by the beauty of this paradigm.  
 It has to stressed that the democratic peace paradigm, in design and orientation, was 
traditionally cut for explaining inter-state relations but in recent times, its jurisdiction has been 
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transformed not less by changing nature of conflicts.48 In the words of Kaldor, “In new wars the 
traditional distinctions between war (violence between states or organized political groups for 
political motives), organizes crime (violence by private associations, usually for financial gains), 
and large scale violation of human rights (violence by states or private groups against 
individuals, mainly civilians) become increasingly blurred.”49 
 In the post-Cold War era, there were increased incidences of intra-state conflicts than 
inter-state conflicts. With reference to Africa, Tekena opines, “the end of the cold war has 
witnessed an upsurge in intra- state conflicts in Africa with very low incidence of inter-state 
conflicts.”50 Consequently, the empirical domain of the democratic peace theory shifted into 
domestic environment of states and found adherents in statesmen and scholars who began to 
apply it to happenings within states. For example, Olu-Adeyemi, applying it to the study of the 
impact of political liberalization and democratization on ethnic conflict in Nigeria, posits, “I 
strongly felt that the theory (democratic peace theory) can still be reasonably applied to the 
internal workings of democratic states. For instance, a state’s inward dispositions will definitely 
reflect on its outward behaviour; thus, if it democratic by content and character, the democratic 
peace theory should be adequate to capture the relationships within its borders.”51  
The 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in the Shadow of 
Democratic Peace Paradigm  
 The process leading to the signing of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance by West African leaders under the auspices of ECOWAS, in Dakar, Senegal, 
on 21 December, 2001, could, in its remote origin, be traced to the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
when the fear of state implosion, following years of genocidal conflicts, in the Mano region, 
gripped the governments of the sub-region. It would be recalled that when the sub-regional 
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outfit, which later became the vanguard of peace-keeping, was established in Lagos, in May, 
1975, its mandate and objective, as stipulated in Article 2 (1) of the treaty establishing it  was to,  
promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity 
particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunication, energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in 
social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its 
peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer 
relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development 
of the African continent.52 
 
Aside from this core mandate and other technical issues defined in the treaty, there is no section of 
the treaty where peace-keeping was mentioned. Put differently, ECOWAS was purely a regional 
integrative framework not cut for peace-keeping. As rightly remarks by Frempong, “none of the 
sixty-five articles of the 1975 ECOWAS treaty signed in Lagos contained any provisions of issues 
related to security or democratic governance.”53 Even the two regional collective security 
frameworks— the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence (ANAD) adopted in 
1979 and 1981, respectively—only took into consideration the likelihood of external aggression 
against member states.54 They never envisaged the magnitude of violence that befell Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, in the 1990s. Indeed, a body of rich literature already exist on the wars in the two 
countries as such does not warrant exclusive details here.55  
 The quest for durable peace in the sub-region as well as the imperatives of preventing 
states that had the prospects of following the Liberian and Sierra Leonean routes, from descending 
into crisis, appeared to have driven the passions of the sub-region’s leaders into the emerging 
global discourse on peace and security. Anchored on the popular aphorism “prevention is better 
than cure,” the new paradigm, it must be stressed, erected on democratic theoretical platform, was 
viewed as a pre-condition for peaceful co-existence among groups within nations. Interestingly, 
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this new thinking set the stage for the emergence of the issues of democracy, human rights and 
governance, at the core of regional discourse.   
 Specifically, as remarked earlier, it prepared ground for the emergence of the Declaration 
of Political Principles, signed by the sub-region’s leaders, on July 6, 1991, at the fourteenth 
Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, in Abuja, Nigeria.56 In the preamble 
to the Protocol, ECOWAS leaders pledged to ensure a stable and secure political environment for 
the people to live in freedom under law.57 They also promised to pool together their efforts to 
promote democracy in the region on the basis of political pluralism and respect for the 
fundamental human rights.58 Further, they promised to respect human rights and freedoms in all 
their plenitude.59 
 Interestingly, similar trajectories were followed in subsequent Protocols—the 1999 
Mechanisms for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts and the 2001 
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Here, it has to be stated that the 
1999 Mechanisms, adopted and signed in Lome, Togo, on December 1999, was first major 
attempt at institutionalizing the sub-region’s peace and security architecture. Beyond this, leaders 
re-affirmed their commitment to the 1991 Principles and also pledged their commitments to the 
promotion and consolidation of a democratic government and institutions in each Member State.60 
Innovatively, Article 25 (b) empowered ECOWAS leaders to apply the Mechanism in the event of 
the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.61 
 The 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (A/SP1/12/01)62 
adopted and signed on 21 December, 2010, in Dakar, Senegal, in term of scope, is perhaps, the 
sub-region’s most comprehensive democracy cum governance related instruments. The Protocol, it 
is believed, if domesticated and implemented by the member states, would not only lay the 
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foundation for a democratic sub-region but would contribute to achieving sustainable peace and 
development. Specifically, it has three Chapters and fifty Articles. Chapter One deals with the 
general principles, elections, elections monitoring, the role of Armed Forces, Police, and other 
security forces in democracy, poverty alleviation and promotion of social dialogue, education, 
culture and religion, rule of law, human rights, and good governance. Chapter Two of the Protocol 
dwells on modalities for implementation and sanction. The third Chapter focuses on other relevant 
clauses like amendments, withdrawal, ratification, and entry into force of the Protocol.  
 The principles outlined in the Protocol, given the continent’s developmental challenges, 
are ambitious. These include values bordering on separation of power, free elections, 
constitutionalism, civil control of the military, and administrative decentralization, among 
others.63 To be sure, the provisions of the protocol were expected having been domesticated and 
operationalized by state parties, to be the spring board for institutionalizing liberal peace within 
states. At this juncture, a question is apt: how far have these states journeyed in this project? 
Before answering, it is imperative to put the political of the sub-region in perspective. It is worthy 
note that prior to the arrival of the 1999 Mechanism, the regime political landscape of the sub-
region, like other parts of the continent, for decades, was in a bad shape, characterized by  all 
genres of political instabilities, arising from authoritarian exercise of power.64 
 It will be recalled that, in 1960, a new chapter was opened in Africa’s political history as 
seventeen countries, majority of which were in West Africa, were ushered into multi-party 
democracies, as independent entities, via electoral processes supervised by the departing colonial 
regimes.65 With the new order, there was much optimism that the new political order would 
incubate a culture of peaceful and democratic change of government. By the time the first set of 
elections were held in these countries, people’s expectations of democratic deepening were dashed 
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as some of the tendencies that had long been suppressed by the colonial masters, while they 
reigned, resurfaced.66 What emerged, in these countries, during this time was an illiberal electoral 
environment in which the incumbent regimes, manipulated the electoral processes, by deploying 
states’ institutions and other resources, to remain in power at all cost.  
 This democratic aberration, however, generated counter measures as the opposition groups, 
in almost equal measures, equally deployed the resources at their disposal to wrestle power from 
the incumbent regimes. Consequently, elections, the periodic festivals of democracy, at all levels 
of the polities assumed the character of warfare in which all instruments were fair.67 Interestingly,  
the evolving environment appeared to have given  the incumbent regimes, whose powers were 
under threats by the oppositions, limitless opportunities, under the guise of promoting national 
integration and curtailing the divisiveness that multi-party electoral competition has wrought on 
their countries,  to guillotine  the oppositions and institutionalize one-party regimes. Thus, across 
the post-colonial divides, West African leaders and their counterparts in other parts of the 
continent, that had been popularly elected through multi-party political frameworks, assumed the 
coronation robe of Louis XIV and personified their states, all in the name of nation-building.  
 Even where the oppositions could not be completely subdued by the incumbents, as were 
cases in Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo, the electoral “warfare” became so intense that the 
specialists in the management of violence—the military—had to step in to save these nations from 
slipping into political implosion.68 Consequently, military coups and counter-coups became 
recurring phenomena in the sub region and thus, for three decades, except in Senegal, the vast 
swaths of the sub region’s governance spaces were ruled by one forms of military regime or the 
other. Although, these coups cut across all regions, they were of greater percentage in the West 
African sub-region. Indeed, as noted by Edi, “in 1985, 11 of the 16 West African countries had 
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military regimes.”69 While such regimes lasted, democracy and other appurtenances associated 
with it were tactically in retreat and in abeyance.   
           However, by the late 1980s, the divine right and other forms of undemocratic 
legitimization that had been deployed for almost two decades to rationalize authoritarianism 
came under severe attacks from pro-democracy movements that demanded the democratization 
of the political and governance spaces.70 These developments generated significant pressures on 
these authoritarian regimes and pushed them on the path of reforms that culminated in different 
forms of liberal democratic transitions.71. Benin (formerly Dahomey) led the way in the emerging 
order, when the strong man, Mathieu Kerekou, a long-serving military dictator, conceded to 
multi-party electoral process and subsequently lost.72 Similar transitions from one-man autocracy 
to constitutional democracy—though not in nearly as dramatic or as quick a fashion as Benin's—
took place across Africa over the course of the 1990s.73 
 Contradictorily, this wind of change only succeeded in producing civilianized presidents, 
in the sub-region, in which long standing military rulers, under controversial circumstances, won 
elections that they supervised.74 Interestingly, during this period, while second elections were 
held in Ghana, Benin, and Mali, there were military putsches in Nigeria (1993), Gambia (1994), 
Niger (1996), Sierra Leone (1996,1997), and Cote d’Ivorie (1999), all which reversed the modest 
gains achieved few years earlier following the adoption of the Political Principle in 1991.75  
 Instructively, the military putsch in Cote D’ Ivorie in December 1999 seemed to have 
marked a turning point in the sub-region’s efforts at stemming unconstitutional change of 
government. Indeed, the coup in Cote D’ Ivorie provided an opportunity for ECOWAS hierarchy 
to test Article 25 (b) of the 1999 Mechanism. Unfortunately, an opportunity of making an 
example of Cote D’ Ivorie was lost as ECOWAS through its Mediation and Security Council 
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(MSC) rather than invoking the expulsion provision in the Mechanism only condemned the coup 
and consequently accepted the development as a silent revolution in Cote D’ Ivorie.76  
 Paradoxically, as Cote D’ Ivorie descended into chaos following a poorly managed 
transition by the beneficiary of the coup, Ghana and Senegal were making democratic gains, as 
power alternated from one democratic regime to the other. These two events appeared to have 
given impetus to the process that spurred the arrival of the Supplementary Protocol.  
 It has to be stressed that, in addressing the violation of some of the provisions of the 2001 
Supplementary Protocol, ECOWAS institutions, like under the previous order, still adopted 
diplomatic means. For example, in Guinea Bissau and Togo respectively, when there were clear 
violations of the two countries’ constitutions by the military, ECOWAS, rather than adopting 
coercive diplomacy, adopted mediation mechanism to settle the constitutional crisis.  In the 
former, it negotiated a safe exit for President Kumba Yula with the support of the junta to 
institute an interim national government. In the Togolese case, it persuaded the military to 
respect the constitutional provisions regarding the succession to the country’s presidency.77 It 
would be recalled that upon the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema, in January 2005, the 
military rather than allowing the Speaker of the Parliament, to emerge as the acting President for 
sixty days, in order to conduct fresh election, in line with the country’s constitution, installed 
Faure Eyadema, the son of the late president as the new Speaker. Not only that, the same 
institution pressured the Parliament to amend the constitution in order to pave way for the new 
Speaker, to the complete the unfinished tenure of the late President.78 
 If the ECOWAS institutions may have partially succeeded, at least, marginally, in 
managing crisis within member states, even though, not in full compliance with the texts of the 
Protocol, what about state parties in their internal political practices? Although, it might be unfair 
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to make a sweeping generalization about countries in the sub-region with regard to their internal 
democratic practice, as a relative minority among them, relatively, might have made significant 
progress in deepening democracy and by extension, nurturing stability79 but generally, the 
practices of democracy, symbolize illiberalism. It then thus implies that their declarations at the 
Lome Summit, where the Protocol was adopted was a mere rhetoric borne out of calculated 
design to impress the donor community.80 To stress this point, it took over three years for these 
countries, except for Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, to ratify the Protocol.81 Beyond this, there have 
been in these countries, though in different degrees, documented cases of infractions—human 
rights abuses, executive lawlessness, press censorships, electoral manipulation, and exclusionary 
practices; all of which tend to threaten peace not only within the countries concerned but the 
entire sub region.82 For example, tenure elongation of incumbent presidents beyond 
constitutional mandated two terms, that started in 2001, when the Guinean President, Lansana 
Conte, stage-managed a referendum that extended his tenure beyond two terms, has spread to 
other countries83—Togo (2002), Burkina Faso (2008), and Gambia (2009). Its spread continues, 
as the 2013 and 2015 episodes in Senegal and Togo clearly suggest.  
 Notwithstanding all these, one sector in which the antithesis in the practice of liberal 
democracy has been more manifest, in the sub-region, is in the electoral processes. Indeed, the 
situation appeared so grave that many observers of contemporary African politics, even doubt, if 
elections could, ever, be mechanism for power transitions in West Africa and beyond.84 Every 
stage of the electoral cycle, especially when the incumbent President is an interested party, as 
was the case in the early period of independence, is usually characterized by electoral fraud and 
massive violence perpetuated by the incumbents against the oppositions. Most times, such state 
of affairs often threatens the positive peace of the countries concerned. For example, the violence 
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that characterized the 2010 presidential election in Cote D’ Ivorie was so massive that the 
international community has to intervene to save the country from implosion.   
 Even, where the pre-election process was not marked by violence, there were still, given 
the illiberal environments in which elections are held in Africa, high expectations of monumental 
violence that may arise from incumbents’ manipulations of the electoral process in order to hang 
on to power. An ECA report in 2009 notes that, “the quality of elections remains suspect in 
manycountries. Often they are less a peaceful means of transferring power than a trigger of 
conflict.”85 In the run to the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria, the two leading contestants for 
the presidency, the incumbent, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan and Alhaji Muhammadu Buhari, had to be 
persuaded by international peace-builders to sign undertaken committing themselves to peaceful 
elections.86 
 The point is that, even though, these countries might have been influenced by the aspect 
of liberal democratic discourse that relates to multi-partyism, free, fair, and competitive 
elections, based on universal adult suffrage and basic civil and political freedoms but its electoral 
maps, contours and directions are, in reality, are still reflective of the illiberal democracies.87 To 
be sure, electoral processes, in many of the countries, rather than moving in progressive 
directions, still mimic the authoritarian practices of the past. In a greater percentage of them,  
incumbent regimes, deploying states’ resources, do not only still harass, torment, intimidate 
perceived or real opposition elements but manipulate the electoral processes to secure strategic 
advantages at the expense of democratic consolidation.88 
 From the foregoing discussion, it might be posited that the region is struggling on the 
path of democratization. According to Mimiko, democratization is a dynamic in the political 
system that is moving the institutional and procedural features of such system closer to the 
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condition of democracy.89 In real terms, what seem to have been entrenched institutionally in the 
sub-region are illiberal regimes of all genres. According to Hague and Harrop,  
Illiberal democracy is based on powerful leader rather than strong institutions. In 
this respect, the format resembles authoritarian rule more than liberal democracy. 
Rather than serving as a representative agent, the president-or, less often, prime 
minister-plays the part of personal ruler, taking care of people’s needs and 
claiming their respect, deference and support in exchange. Having elected a 
saviour, the voters are expected to cheer from the stands, only entering the 
political field at their own risk.90 
 
 Reinforcing the above contention with reference to sub-Sahara Africa, Herbst is of the 
view that, “it is wrong to conclude that African states are travelling between democracy and 
authoritarianism simply because majority of them belong to neither category. Rather the current 
condition of African states could well prevail for decades.”91 Seen in these contexts, 
democratization might be posited to be in abeyance in the sub region.92 Suttner has posited that, 
“whether democracy is consolidated depends also on the extension and deepening of democracy, 
the involvement of people in politics during and between elections, the viability of participatory 
democracy and the existence of autonomous organizations of civil society, organs of direct 
democracy.”93 
 What could clearly be gleaned from the foregoing is that liberal democracy imposed on 
Africa countries, ECOWAS countries inclusive, in decades of practice, generated its own 
antithesis. It has produced an outcome that is neither, as Herbst described it, neither democratic 
nor authoritarian. Specifically, liberal democracy, in badly divided societies, because of its 
inadaptability, has generated much antimony that has even threatened to bring some countries 
down. This model of democracy, according to Ake, offers African rights they cannot exercise, 
voting that never amounts to choosing, freedom which is patently spurious, and political equality 
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which distinguishes highly unequal power relations.94Ironically, this framework was accepted by 
West African governments and has been replicated in Protocols.   
Conclusion  
 There is no doubt that democracy, in its classical, deliberative and popular sense is a sine 
qua non for peaceful co-existence among individuals and groups within and between 
communities. However, unfortunately, this is not the model of democracy that has been globalized 
to the Third World countries. Incidentally, it was this model of democracy—the liberal 
Schumpeterian variant that was favoured and adopted by West African statesmen, through the 
2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy. As revealed in this study, this model of democracy, 
codified in majority of provisions of the Supplementary Protocol, rather than deepening 
democracy and by implication, nurtures peaceful co-existence among citizens, has incubated 
illiberalism and other antinomies that have worked to subvert the integrity of states in the sub-
region. The conclusion is that beyond West Africa’s leaders’ rhetoric and predilection with liberal 
democracy to satisfy their patrons, what the sub-region and its people need is a model of 
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